

S E C R E T

Jigsaw

20 February 1950

MEMORANDUM TO **JIGSAW Committee**

FROM: **Sub-Committee**

SUBJECT: **Progress Report**

This Sub-Committee has been assigned the task of drawing up a specific program, for JIGSAW's consideration, dealing with the field of "International Communist Organization and Activity." The final report of this Sub-Committee will include proposals for specific topics to be investigated, priorities, sub-allocations to participating agencies or research organizations (and scheduling, so far as it can be foreseen). This is a progress report, in which the Sub-Committee is indicating the direction of its thinking and presenting some of the proposals now being discussed by it.

In planning a program for research in this field, the Sub-Committee is considering a series of steps that may be taken with reference to three types of projects:

A. Departmental Intelligence Assignments

Each intelligence agency, in its normal day-to-day work within its own department, will execute numerous assignments which contribute directly to the operations of that department.

21 FEB 1950
AD-1

LRI

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

For example, State Intelligence will estimate the Communist plans and capabilities in the strike campaign against the Military Defense Aid Program in connection with the State Department's duties in the MDAP; ONI will evaluate the present extent of Communist infiltration in the French Navy in connection with the requirements of the North Atlantic Treaty; G-2 will analyse the strength of Communist para-military forces in Western Europe during 1950 in connection with the formulation of American plans; etc.

By their very nature, of course, these departmental intelligence assignments cannot easily be planned in advance. The assignments will be made as the situation requires, and be given by the appropriate department to its intelligence agency. JIGSAW will want to do little in connection with planning or allocating such assignments. However, it may be possible to increase the profit which the American government derives from such research projects by such measures as:

1. Giving appropriate notification to other intelligence agencies concerning such projects, to avoid duplication when possible;
2. Encouraging the keeping of master copies showing sources used, when the departmental assignment does not call for footnotes or sources;
3. Listing gaps found in the source material, at the end of the project, in order that steps to fill these gaps may be taken.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

B. Exploratory Summaries in Areas of Limited Information

Any examination of the current efforts to meet the intelligence requirements in the field of International Communism soon reveals the fact that many basic questions are still unsatisfactorily answered, as yet. Even more important, little is being done to provide an adequate basis for answering these questions. Many gaps in our information exist concerning them, and, in some instances, the American intelligence agencies are conducting few active research operations with reference to them.

The Sub-Committee is considering a recommendation that JIGSAW draw up a program of special research projects in this general area with the object of:

1. Bringing together and summarizing the available information in Washington;
2. Pointing up the important gaps which exist;
3. Presenting, if possible, one or more working hypotheses on the problem;
4. Circulating the paper to all interested agencies in Washington and the field in order to secure all available bits of information, clues, ideas and suggestions, and in order to alert all agencies on the subject.

S E C R E T

Suggestions for such exploratory summaries include the following:

1. The mechanism of International Communism for control of, and communication with, the national Communist parties (sources of directives, means of communication, use of Cominform and Soviet agencies, international liaison methods of national Communist parties, couriers and other individual agents, etc.);
2. Finances in the World Communist Movement (known and overt sources of income within national Communist parties; evidence of direct Soviet assistance in money and materials; use of international and national front organizations for raising and transmitting funds; known expenditures in the national parties, etc.);
3. Communist operations in the military and para-military fields;
4. Facilities and methods for the training of non-Soviet Communists for leadership in the foreign Communist parties.

C. Comprehensive Reports on Basic Research Projects

In those cases where adequate data is available for conclusions concerning important areas of Communist organization

- 4 -

S E C R E T

and operation, JIGSAW must encourage the expenditure of sufficient manpower to do the necessary research, analysis and reporting. A sample list of such projects -- incomplete, and without any suggestions concerning priorities -- follows:

(I. Operations and Tactics of the World Communist Movement and its Basic Organizations)

1. Detailed analysis of Communist tactics in the Communist International;
2. Evaluation of Responsibilities and Methods of the Cominform;
1. 3. Impact of Tito and other defections on the cohesiveness of the World Communist Movement;
4. Patterns of changing leadership at top and secondary levels of the World Communist Movement.

(II. Communist Operations Within and Through Political Front Organizations)

2. 5. Communist control and utilization of the "Partisans of Peace" movement;
6. Communist operations in the World Federation of Trade Unions;
7. Communist operations in the World Federation of Democratic Youth;
8. Communist operations in the Women's International Democratic Federation;

S E C R E T

9. Communist operations in the secondary front organizations (International Organization of Journalists, International Federation of Democratic Lawyers, etc.);
10. The pattern of Communist operations and strategy in the front organizations.

(III. Communist Organizations and Capabilities in the Strategic Industries)

11. Perspectives and present plans of the International Trade Federations of the World Federation of Trade Unions;
- 3 12. Communist potentials and capabilities in the maritime industry;
13. Communist potentials and capabilities in the transportation industry;
- 4 14. The operational mechanisms of international Communism in the anti-MDAP strike movement;
15. Communist potentials and capabilities in the fuel industries;

(IV. Special Areas of Communist Activity)

16. International propaganda agencies and mechanisms of the World Communist movement (news agencies, special publications, dissemination of publishable materials, etc.).

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

17. Communist operational methods and tactics in the UN;
 18. Communist policies and organizations in the Moslem world;
 19. Communist policies and actions in the South Pacific and Middle East, 1947-1950;
 20. Communist infiltration in the French military forces;
 21. Communist para-military forces in Italy
- (V. Anti-Stalinist Forces Competing with the World Communist Bodies for Support)
22. Anti-Stalinist international bodies competing with Communist political front organizations (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, World Assembly of Youth, etc.);
 23. The international movement of Trotskyite organizations;
 24. Anti-Communist plans and actions of the international religious agencies;
 25. Social democracy and its international organs (COMISCO)

S E C R E T

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
20 Febr. 50		
DATE		
TO: Chairman, Jigsaw Committee		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS: Attached please find the Progress Report. Except no. 3 on page 4, the Sub-Committee Chairman did not permit any further changes. Since I did not want to delay distribution, I had the Report mailed out as is. It is provisional anyway and will be further detailed and revised in subsequent meetings of the Sub-Committee.		
FROM: Secretary, Jigsaw Committee		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946